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Due Process and Deportation: A
Critical Examination of the
Plenary Power and the
Fundamental Fairness Doctrine
By Ray D. Gardner*
Introduction
Although federal courts have consistently considered deporta-
tion proceedings as civil or administrative hearings rather than
criminal prosecutions,1 they have concurrently held that aliens
subject to deportation are entitled to many of the due process pro-
tections afforded the criminal defendant.2 Aliens presently enjoy
limited rights to counsel,3 to freedom from self incrimination,' and
to reasonable notice of the nature of the charges against them.5
Aliens have been completely denied the protection of the constitu-
tional prohibitions against double jeopardy, ex post facto laws, and
cruel and unusual punishment in accordance with the theory that
such rights only attach to criminal prosecutions.6 The question
here considered is whether there is a valid distinction between
criminal and deportation proceedings, and if there is, whether it
justifies a judicial and congressional grant of certain limited consti-
tutional due process rights and the denial of others.
The law governing procedural due process 7 in deportation
hearings is in a state of flux. The federal circuit courts are divided
* B.A., 1977, Humboldt State University;, member, third year class.
1. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Nai Cheng Chen v. INS, 537
F.2d 566, 568 (1st Cir. 1976).
2. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-
Grath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
3. Ramirez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1977); Chlomos v. Department of Justice,
516 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1975).
4. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977); Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279
F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960).
5. United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1975); Immigration & Nation-
ality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1976).
6. See 1A C. GORDON & H. Rosmnsw, IMMGRATION LAW AND PRocEDuRE §§ 4.3c, .3h,
.3i (1980). See § III(F) infra.
7. The issues considered here are limited to the procedural rights of aliens in deporta-
tion hearings. This analysis includes the process by which aliens are deported rather than
substantive issues of law.
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on important issues that directly affect the constitutional rights of
aliens, and the Supreme Court seems unwilling to address these
issues in order to assure that aliens will be subject to a uniform
system of justice throughout the United States." The Court's re-
fusal to take deportation cases contributes to the general feeling of
insecurity which permeates alien communities.
Much of the confusion plaguing deportation law results di-
rectly from the interaction between the plenary power of Congress
over aliens and the limits imposed on that power by procedural
due process requirements.9 Although the plenary power to expel
aliens is theoretically unlimited,10 the Supreme Court has imposed
constitutional restrictions via the Fourteenth Amendment.1' How-
ever, by relying on the nebulous doctrine of "fundamental fair-
ness," 2 the Court has failed to clearly define the nature and scope
of these restrictions. In fact, the Court has created even greater
confusion by defining alien rights with terms analogous to those
used in criminal proceedings.' 3 Deportation procedure remains a
mutant which sprang from the marriage between civil and criminal
law principles.
A good example of the confusion created by the Supreme
Court's refusal to adjudicate deportation issues is found in the area
of Fourth Amendment search and seizure. The Court ruled in
dicta, in United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod,14 that the exclu-
sionary rule was applicable to deportation proceedings. During the
initial fifty-five years following Bilokumsky, however, the federal
courts have failed to determine the exact scope of the rule as it
relates to immigration law.' 5 The circuits remain in conflict as to
whether the rule should apply to deportation proceedings under
any circumstances. 16 The Supreme Court's failure to resolve this
issue has created conflict and confusion which affects the entire
immigration field. In addition, the circuit courts have promulgated
8. But see Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 277 (1966) (where the Court finally decided the
burden of proof issue because the Second Circuit seemed incapable of making a coherent
judgment).
9. See generally J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 902 (1978).
10. See Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (reference to unfettered congres-
sional power).
11. See Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
12. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
13. See notes 186, 187 & 203 and accompanying text infra.
14. 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923)(dicta).
15. Cf. Matter of Sandoval, Interim Decision 2725, at 7 (BIA 1979) (the Board of Im-
migration Appeals claimed that the federal courts had merely avoided the issue for 55
years).
16. See text accompanying notes 211-19 infra.
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elaborate search and seizure rules which govern the activity of Im-
migration Officers, yet they have failed to determine whether they
will admit evidence seized in violation of those rules. 7 Immigration
Officers will naturally tend to disregard the law as long as the
courts remain unwilling to provide a method of enforcement.
The inability of the circuit courts to resolve issues concerning
the Immigration and Nationality Act18 allows the Immigration Ser-
vice to follow its own rules where no court has decided the issue or
has decided the issue in the Service's favor, and to follow contrary
court rulings only in those parts of the country subject to that
court's jurisdiction. For example, in Lok v. Immigration & Natu-
ralization Service"' the Second Circuit decided that permanent
residence status was not a prerequisite for a discretionary waiver of
deportation. 20 "After the Lok decision, the BIA21 announced that
the INS22 would observe the Lok interpretation of [the Act] in the
Second Circuit .... Believing that interpretation to be incorrect,
however, the BIA added that it would adhere to its own interpreta-
tion outside the Second Circuit.
'2 3
The Ninth Circuit subsequently supported the BIA's construc-
tion of the statutory language and rejected the argument that the
discrepancy in the Service's policy constituted a violation of the
equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment due process
clause.24 According to Circuit Judge Bright, the Immigration Ser-
vice tends to completely ignore the judiciary on this issue. In Bowe
v. Immigration and Naturalization Service2s he stated that:
"[t]his court must recognize that. . . the Service in fact exercises
discretionary power in some cases to waive deportability of drug
offenders, under [the Act] notwithstanding this circuit's decisions
denying the existence of such power.
'2 6
Not only has the Immigration Service refused to comply with
circuit court rulings, it has also failed to comply with its own
rules.27 Despite this fact, the federal courts have not agreed on a
17. Id.
18. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976).
19. 548 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1977).
20. Id. at 38. 8 U.S.C. § 1182c (1976) requires a seven year period of lawful unrelin-
quished domicile.
21. Board of Immigration Appeals.
22. Immigration & Naturalization Service.
23. Castillo-Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 467 (9th Cir. 1979)(citation omitted).
24. Id. See also Bowe v. INS, 597 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1979).
25. 597 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1979).
26. Id. at 1159 (citation omitted).
27. See, e.g., Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1979).
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uniform standard for determining the impact of the Service's viola-
tions of its own regulations.2 8 As with the controversy over the ap-
plication of the exclusionary rule, the federal court system's failure
to determine whether the Immigration Service's regulations create
due process rights29 has left the alien community without any pro-
tection against administrative abuses of power. In lieu of congres-
sional intervention, the Supreme Court should determine that the
Service is not only bound by its own regulations," but that its de-
portation efforts must fail when the broken rules directly affect
procedural due process rights.
The biggest flaw in the judicial formulation of due process
rights in deportation cases stems from the fact that the doctrine
upon which these rights depend, fundamental fairness, has not yet
been given a definition by the federal courts.31 If the circuits are
unable to agree on what kind of procedural errors constitute fun-
damental unfairness, 2 then they certainly cannot determine the
nature and scope of due process rights in deportation actions. This
problem may be aggravated by the ambivalent attitude that judges
hold with respect to the deportation process. Throughout history
federal judges have decried the harshness and the punitive charac-
ter of deportation,3 yet with the same stroke of the pen they have
held that aliens are not protected by the same procedural safe-
guards afforded criminals.
I. Historical Perspective 3
4
A. Exclusion of Aliens
The power of Congress to control immigration was originally
based on the premise that "every sovereign nation has the power,
as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to
forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit
to prescribe."3 5 Although the Supreme Court occasionally has at-
tempted to justify governmental control of immigration as a power
28. See notes 94-129 and accompanying text infra.
29. Id.
30. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
31. See § III(A) infra.
32. Id.
33. See note 249 infra.
34. For a good chronological summary of restrictive immigration legislation see [1952]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws 1653-74.
35. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
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incidental to various treaty obligations, 6 the primary justification
has been the powers inherent in sovereignty theory. Neither the
President, the Congress, nor the Supreme Court has ever at-
tempted to find a constitutional basis for the many and varied laws
which regulate the flow of aliens into the United States.
The first cases to adhere to the theory that power over aliens
is inherent in sovereignty dealt with situations where the govern-
ment sought to exclude rather than expel aliens.3 7 This distinction
was crucial because although aliens did not have a constitutional
right to enter the United States, once legally here, they could claim
most of the constitutional rights which citizens enjoy.38 By sub-
scribing to the sovereignty theory and attributing the exclusion
power to the legislative39 and executive" branches, the early cases
neglected to assign the Constitution a role in exclusion proceed-
ings. The Supreme Court did, however, conclude that the power to
exclude aliens on facts determined by executive officers was not
subject to judicial review.41 Even today, the President and the
Congress exercise unfettered control over the quantity and charac-
ter of aliens entering the United States.
The Court's unwillingness to extend constitutional protection
to persons desiring entry into the United States allowed the gov-
ernment to enforce an immigration policy which only responded to
the needs of the marketplace."2 Aliens were considered mere com-
modities, subject to the law of supply and demand. This attitude
continues to influence modern immigration law and policy.
43
B. Expulsion of Aliens
The Supreme Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United States44 reaf-
firmed the notion that the power to exclude aliens from our shores
lay with the political branches of government, and extended the
rationale to encompass the power to expel aliens.4' The Court pro-
claimed that "[t]he right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners,
36. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 597 (1889).
37. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581 (1889).
38. See 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 1.31,
.32 (1980).
39. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
40. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
41. Id.
42. National Lawyers Guild, IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE §§ 2.1-.9 (2d ed. 1979).
43. Id. at § 2.8.
44. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
45. Id. at 705, 707.
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who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards becom-
ing citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as
absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their
entrance into the country. 44 Although the Court's language
seemed to imply that the powers inherent in sovereignty justify
only the expulsion of aliens who fail to take "steps towards becom-
ing citizens," these powers have nevertheless provided the justifica-
tion for all forms of deportation. 7 Those aliens who have taken
"steps toward becoming citizens," such as lawful permanent re-
sidents,48 receive essentially the same consideration as illegal
aliens.49
Fong Yue Ting laid the foundation upon which modern depor-
tation law was built. The Supreme Court concluded that deporta-
tion was not punishment, but rather "the removal of an alien out
of the country. . . without any punishment being imposed or con-
templated."' 0 Deportation was considered necessary to protect the
public welfare;51 the hardship it might work on the deportee was
not considered material.
The Fong Yue Ting Court took the position that aliens were
entitled to constitutional safeguards in all matters except exclusion
and expulsion.5 2 Congress could expel aliens "whenever in its judg-
ment their removal is necessary or expedient for the public inter-
est. '53 But if aliens were subject to a completely arbitrary expul-
sion power, they would be incapable or unwilling to assert their
constitutional rights. Under the Fong Yue Ting rationale, for ex-
ample, an alien exercising his right to free speech in a manner crit-
ical of the government could be summarily deported as an expedi-
ent for the public interest.
In order to justify this extreme position, the Court distin-
guished but did not overrule Yick Wo v. Hopkins,54 despite the
46. Id. at 707.
47. § 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1976), applies
to any noncitizen of the United States.
48. See, e.g., Bassett v. INS, 581 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1978).
49. See, e.g., Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977). As a practical matter,
an alien's status may come to the Immigration Service's attention only when he or she ap-
plies for naturalization.
50. 149 U.S. at 709.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 724.
53. Id.
54. 118 U.S. 356 (1886)(holding invalid the discriminatory enforcement of a statute
regulating Chinese laundries as contrary to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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fact that Yick Wo found the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to
aliens. Since Yick Wo did not specifically relate to the political ex-
pulsion power, and since deportation proceedings were not crimi-
nal trials which could result in the deprivation of life, liberty or
property, the Fong Yue Ting Court refused to apply the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments.5
Justice Brewer dissented in Fong Yue Ting, claiming that
aliens "who have become domiciled in the [United States] are enti-
tled to a more distinct and larger measure of protection that those
who are simply passing through.""8 Because he believed the gov-
ernment's powers over all domiciliaries of the United States to be
limited by the Constitution,57 he argued that there was no absolute
power to deport. He rejected the inherent powers theory and rea-
soned that if aliens were protected under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 58 because they were persons living within the United States,
then the use of the words "people," "person" and "accused" in the
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments should, by analogy, make
those constitutional rights applicable to aliens as well as citizens.59
He further maintained that deportation "imposes punishment
without a trial," and, characterizing such punishment as "cruel and
severe," he indicated that it ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment."
Justice Field, in a separate dissenting opinion, agreed with
Justice Brewer's reasoning but used much stronger language. He
stated that the deportation "punishment is beyond all reason in its
severity. It is cruel and unusual.. . . Every step in the procedure
. . . tramples upon some constitutional right."'
The objections made by Justices Brewer and Field have been
repeated in many strong dissents which assert that aliens are enti-
tled to a greater degree of constitutional protection.2 In fact, a
majority of the Court later partially accepted the Brewer-Field
analysis by holding that resident aliens are entitled to the protec-
tion of the Bill of Rights. 3
55. 149 U.S. at 725, 730.
56. Id. at 734 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 738.
58. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
59. 149 U.S. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 760 (Field, J., dissenting).
62. See note 249 infra.
63. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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C. The Japanese Immigrant Case
The Court's initial departure from the Fong Yue Ting stan-
dard came in the Japanese Immigrant Case,"" the first decision to
impose constitutional limits on deportation actions. The Immigra-
tion Service had declared that a young Japanese woman was likely
to become a public charge; she was therefore deportable under the
1891 Act. 5 The alien, Ms. Yamataya, was taken into custody
shortly after her arrival in Seattle. Her counsel argued that the
sovereign power theory did not apply to aliens dwelling in the
United States because they were "persons" within the meaning of
the Constitution. 6 He also argued that Ms. Yamataya had been
"deprived of her liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution . . in that she was not given any notice or op-
portunity to be heard.
'67
The Court accepted the latter argument and rejected the for-
mer, thereby creating tension between the plenary power and the
constitutional rights of aliens.6 8 Aliens were subject to expulsion by
administrative officers in conformity with regulations promulgated
pursuant to the plenary power, yet they were entitled also to due
process of law. Despite the ex parte nature of Ms. Yamataya's
hearing, the Court affirmed the deportation order because she had
"never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicil or residence
within the United States," and "[a]s to such persons, the decisions
of executive or administrative officers ... are due process of
law."
69
The Court, while reaffirming the congressional power to estab-
lish regulations for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens,7 0 had nev-
ertheless taken a giant libertarian step forward. Without expressly
overruling Fong Yue Ting, the Court had required that adminis-
trative officers observe the fundamental principles of due process
when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of
aliens.71 However, the Court did not clearly define fundamental
due process principles. Justice Harlan stated that:
One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his
liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before
64. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
65. Id. at 87; see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1552 (1976).
66. 189 U.S. at 89 (argument for appellant).
67. Id. at 90.
68. See National Lawyers Guild, IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 6.2 (2d ed. 1979).
69. 189 U.S. at 98.
70. Id. at 97.
71. Id. at 100.
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such officers, in respect of the matters upon which that liberty
depends-not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occa-
sion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one
that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by
Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of
the case upon which such officers are required to act.
7 2
Unfortunately, this was of little use to aliens in Ms. Ya-
mataya's position. Alien domiciliaries of the United States were
entitled only, at some point determined by an administrative of-
ficer, to speak in their own behalf. Despite the analogies drawn by
the Fong Yue Ting dissenters, aliens did not have the rights nor-
mally associated with criminal proceedings. There was no right to
counsel, no right to remain silent, and no protection against double
jeopardy.
Although the Japanese Immigrant Case constitutes the mod-
ern rule regarding due process in deportation proceedings,7 the
ambiguous standard set by the Court has caused a tremendous
amount of confusion in deportation procedure. The Court did not
define the exact parameters of alien due process rights, and the
federal courts have struggled with the problems for nearly a
century.
II. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that de-
portation hearings must "meet the essential standards of fair-
ness," 74 the courts have neglected to fix those standards. In order
to eliminate the uncertainty shrouding deportation procedure,
Congress passed the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 7
also known as the McCarran Act. The purpose of the bill was to
codify and revise immigration laws in accordance with then ex-
isting law and the then most recent decisions of the Supreme
Court." Whether or not the Act has accomplished its objectives is
a difficult question to answer. Despite the fact that it has created a
greater degree of certainty in deportation law by specifying, inter
alia, which procedures satisfy the judicial requirement of funda-
72. Id. at 101.
73. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); Nicholas v. INS, 590
F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979).
74. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
75. Pub. L. No. 414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976)).
76. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1653; 98 CONG. REc. 4301 (1952).
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mental fairness,7 it has not eliminated the inherent contradiction
which arises from the premise that even though deportation puts
"the liberty of an individual. . . at stake," it "is not technically a
criminal proceeding.
'7 8
Congress quite naturally based its authority to enact the stat-
ute on the powers inherent in sovereignty theory.79 Not a single
Congressman recorded an objection to the theory because the ple-
nary power had become firmly established in the years following
Fong Yue Ting.80 One Congressman, however, objected to the bill
on the ground that it did not fulfill the requirements of due pro-
cess. He stated that:
Anyone who has read this bill carefully must be greatly concerned
with the almost arbitrary power it bestows upon officials to seize,
deport, or bar aliens from this country without the right of ap-
peal. Deportation, for example, can be authorized by such officials
for technical violations of law, and in some cases even where no
violation of law is involved .... It would grant to immigration
officials unprecedented powers for search, seizure, and deporta-
tion of aliens in this country.81
The Act was designed, among other things, to define alien
rights in deportation proceedings. Ironically, it accomplished this
objective by denying aliens most of the rights normally associated
with proceedings involving deprivations of liberty.
' The McCarran Act authorizes administrative hearings to de-
termine deportability. Immigration judges8 2 conduct the proceed-
ings under the express authority of the Attorney General. They
"present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-ex-
amine the alien or witnesses, and . . . make determinations, in-
cluding orders of deportation." 3 In most respects they function as
do other judges, but they lack some characteristics of an indepen-
dent judiciary because they are creatures of the statute and em-
ployees of the Service.
Although immigration judges exercise discretion in many areas
77. See notes 130-48 and accompanying text infra.
78. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
79. See note 76 supra.
80. Congress did not share the doubts of the many judges who had dissented against
the theory. See note 249 infra.
81. 98 CONG. REc. 4311 (remarks of Rep. Heller). He further complained that the bill
"provides for procedures which... run directly counter to the basic principles underlying
civil liberty and the bill of rights." Id.
82. Formerly called Special Inquiry Officers.
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1976).
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of deportation procedure," the statute expressly extends certain
due process rights to persons subject to deportation. Aliens are
guaranteed notice of the nature of the charges against them, and
they enjoy the right of counsel (though not at government ex-
pense), the right to assert a defense, and the right to a decision
based on substantial and probative evidence. 5
The Act was not designed to create rights, but rather to codify
immigration laws in accordance with existing law,86 and perhaps to
prevent the federal courts from expanding procedural due process
in deportation actions.87 It may have been the congressional re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's decision in Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-
Grath.88 There, the Court concluded that the recently passed Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act89 was applicable to deportation
proceedings. The Service claimed that the Administrative Act did
not apply to deportation"0 and supported bills in Congress to ex-
empt the agency from its requirement for a hearing before an im-
partial judge.9 '
Despite the fact that the Immigration Act 92 then in effect did
not contain an express requirement for a hearing, the Court re-
jected the argument that Congress did not intend for there to be
such a requirement. Justice Jackson stated that "[t]he constitu-
tional requirement of procedural due process of law derives from
the same source as Congress' power to legislate and, where applica-
ble, permeates every valid enactment of that body."93 The Court
therefore adopted the Administrative Procedure Act as a standard
of fairness in deportation procedure. Congress may have passed
the 1952 Act in order to reassert control over the process of exclud-
ing and expelling aliens.
The Immigration Service's regulations create almost as many
due process problems as does the 1952 Act. Although the federal
84. E.g., Wun Man Lau v. INS, 426 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1970) (upholding a discretionary
denial of voluntary departure).
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)-(4)(1976).
86. See note 76 supra.
87. See generally, Note, Due Process and Deportation-Is There a Right to Assigned
Counsel?, 8 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 289, 296-97 (1975) (concluding that the courts may have re-
frained from creating a right to assigned counsel because of the specific statutory admoni-
tion of "not at government expense" in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (1976)).
88. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
89. Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1011 (1976)).
90. 339 U.S. at 48.
91. Id. at 41-45.
92. Pub. L. No. 64-301, 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
93. 339 U.S. at 49.
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courts have generally held that the Immigration Service must com-
ply with its own rules,94 they have not determined whether the reg-
ulations themselves create due process rights."5 In Bridges v.
Wixon96 the Supreme Court vacated a deportation order because
of noncompliance with an Immigration Service regulation gov-
erning the admissability of statements taken out of court, but did
not address the issue of whether the regulations actually created
procedural due process rights.
In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy97 the Court
decided that once the Attorney General conferred discretionary
power on the Board of Immigration Appeals, he was precluded
from interfering with or avoiding the Board's exercise of that
power.98 The Court indicated that the regulations could confer
rights not otherwise granted to aliens by stating that "[t]he crucial
question is whether the alleged conduct of the Attorney General
deprived petitioner of any of the rights guaranteed him by the
statute or by the regulations. . ."91 However, the holding in Ac-
cardi did not specifically determine when or under what circum-
stances due process rights could be created by regulation. Accardi
also failed to provide a rational framework upon which the Attor-
ney General could rely when formulating regulations which create
alien rights. Once again, major issues were left for the circuit
courts to decide.
The First Circuit has taken the position that compliance with
the regulations is necessary to insure due process in deportation
proceedings. 100 According to Judge Tuttle's opinion in Navia-
Duran v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,'10 the fact that
"the Constitution does not offer the same level of protection to
persons subject to civil proceedings as it does to criminal defen-
dants, cannot excuse the failure of federal agencies to abide by
their own regulations. 102 Judge Tuttle claimed that "[t]he rule
94. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); MacLeod v. INS, 327 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1964)(order to show
cause pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (1980) did not inform the defendant of the charges
against him).
95. See Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d
803 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Floulis, 457 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
96. 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
97. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
98. Id. at 265-67.
99. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
100. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 809.
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that such agency failure violated due process evolved in the con-
text of civil not criminal proceedings." 103 Although he accepted the
Service's argument that Miranda v. Arizona104 does not apply to
deportation actions, he held that aliens possessed a right to be in-
formed of rights conferred upon them by the regulations.105
The First Circuit's position is the most liberal in the nation.
Judge Tuttle in Navia-Duran clearly held that the regulations
were capable of creating due process rights. In addition, he put the
Service on notice that violations of alien rights would hinder and
in some cases reverse the deportation process. 10 6
In Nicholas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,10 7 the
Ninth Circuit held that agency regulations did not create due pro-
cess rights," 8 but did not go so far as to completely reject the First
Circuit's position. In Nicholas, the suspect alien had sought rever-
sal of a deportation order, claiming that the Service's failure to
provide him with copies of exhibits, as required by the regula-
tions,20 9 was a violation of due process.110 He also claimed the Ser-
vice had violated his rights by failing to consider his request for
non-priority status pursuant to the Service's Operations
Instructions.""
The circuit court 112 held that the petitioner's first argument
failed because there was no showing that he had been "denied a
meaningful opportunity to litigate the issues presented on ap-
peal."118 Implicit in the court's analysis was the notion that a viola-
tion of the regulations would not be considered a per se denial of
due process unless the alien could demonstrate prejudice. How-
ever, the court took a contrary approach to the immigration judge's
failure to comply with the Operation Instructions. The majority
103. Id.
104. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
105. 568 F.2d at 809. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1980) states that the Service must inform sus-
pects of their rights.
106. 568 F.2d at 808-09.
107. 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979).
108. Id. at 807.
109. 8 C.F.R. § 292.4(b)(1980) states that the Service must supply the accused with
copies of exhibits.
110. 590 F.2d at 809.
111. The immigration judge summarily denied the petitioner's request despite the fact
that Operations Instruction 103.1(a)(1)(ii) required him to consider the existence of humani-
tarian factors, including the defendant's age, the number of years he had lived in the United
States, his physical and mental condition, his family situation, and his recent moral
conduct.
112. District Judge Takasugi was designated to sit on the circuit court bench.
113. 590 F.2d at 810.
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found that although the rules did not create procedural rights,
breaking them could constitute a denial of due process if the disre-
garded rule directly affected substantive rights.
114
In Nicholas, the immigration judge's failure to consider the
existence of certain humanitarian factors before denying the re-
quest for deferred action resulted in the immediate deportation of
the petitioner. The court found the alien's substantive right "to
continue residence in the United States"11 5 to have been directly
affected by the rules governing the immigration judge's decision.
Nicholas significantly differed from Navia-Duran in that it re-
stricted the Attorney General's power to create procedural due
process rights, limiting it to situations where regulations directly
affected substantive rights or violated due process standards.
The Federal District Court in Western Pennsylvania has taken
the most conservative position on this issue. In United States v.
Flouis,"6 the district court followed the portion of the Nicholas
decision which held that a violation of a regulation must be evalu-
ated to determine if it renders the proceeding fundamentally un-
fair,117 but did not agree with the concept that a violation affecting
substantive rights automatically results in a denial of due process.
Claiming that Fourteenth Amendment due process could not
change each time a new regulation was passed,11 8 the court found
that the immigration judge's failure to advise the suspect alien of
his rights119 and to give him seventy-two hours advance notice of
the time and place to surrender 120 did not constitute a denial of
due process. The Floulis Court, by viewing the regulations as unre-
lated to traditional procedural due process rights, in that the Ser-
vice's failure to obey them could not affect the deportation ma-
chinery, ignored the realities of modern deportation procedure. 21
Should the federal courts ultimately find that noncompliance
with the regulations constitutes a per se denial of due process, 22
or, alternatively, that noncompliance will result in a denial of due
process only when it affects substantive rights,123 then advocates
114. Id. at 807.
115. Id.
116. 457 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
117. Id. at 1355.
118. Id. at 1354.
119. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) (1980).
120. Id. at § 243.3.
121. See, e.g., notes 9-16 and accompanying text supra.
122. See Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977).
123. See Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979).
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will be able to identify those regulations which the courts will rec-
ognize as giving rise to procedural due process rights in deporta-
tion actions. Among the more significant rights which could be
found in the regulations are the right to a written record,124 the
right to communicate with foreign embassies,125 the right to appeal
to an administrative officer 12 6 and to Board of Immigration Ap-
peals, 27 and the right to be advised of one's rights when arrested,
whether pursuant to a warrant 28 or not.129 Unfortunately, an alien
cannot be sure which of these rights he possesses unless he knows
how the federal court has decided the issue of agency regulations




The federal judiciary has applied the fundamental fairness
doctrine to criminal and immigration procedure. The disparity be-
tween the rights afforded criminals and those afforded aliens il-
luminates the basic flaws in the doctrine. As noted earlier, the fed-
eral courts have failed to clearly define the exact due process rights
afforded aliens in deportation proceedings.130 Nonetheless, they
have adamantly proclaimed that deportation actions must comply
with the rather nebulous standard of fundamental fairness.' In
Aguilera-Enriquez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
3 2
the Sixth Circuit held that "if procedures mandated by Congress
do not provide an alien with procedural due process, they must
yield."1 3 However, the Sixth Circuit's language seems to conflict
with the Supreme Court's determination that deportation proceed-
ings are civil in character and subject to the plenary power of
Congress.3
124. 8 C.F.R. § 242.15 (1980).
125. Id. at § 242.2(e).
126. Id. at § 242.2(b).
127. Id. at § 242.21.
128. Id. at § 242.2(a).
129. Id. at § 287.3.
130. See, e.g., Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. IMI. 1975), rev'd mem., 529 F.2d 530
(7th Cir. 1976).
131. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. at 154.
132. 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
133. Id. at 568.
134. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 (1952) (holding that aliens are
present in the United States not as a matter of right but as a matter of tolerance and
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The elasticity of the fundamental fairness doctrine becomes
apparent when one attempts to determine when a deportation pro-
ceeding is so fundamentally unfair as to violate due process rights.
As one commentator has stated: "In assessing the dictates of 'fun-
damental fairness,' courts determined the requirements of proce-
dural due process in a one-step process without any clear attempt
to distinquish the question of what specific interests are entitled to
due process protection, from the inquiry into what process is
due.,
135
An order of deportation is reversible if the immigration judge's
decision is in any way "'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion or otherwise not in accordance with law.' ,L36 However, the
federal courts are split as to what standard to apply when deter-
mining whether or not there has been a violation of the alien's due
process rights.
In United States v. Floulis, 37 the district court held that an
alien facing deportation must be afforded at least some Fourteenth
Amendment protections. Deportation actions, the court main-
tained, could only be determined to be fundamentally unfair when
the appellate court concluded that there had been a "gross miscar-
riage of justice in the former proceedings."13 8 The Floulis decision
was based upon two earlier federal court of appeals decisions,
United States ex rel. Steffner v. Carmichael' 9 in the Fifth Cir-
cuit, and McLeod v. Peterson140 in the Third Circuit. While the
Third and Fifth Circuits continue to apply a twenty year old stan-
dard, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have formulated a new ap-
proach: a violation of due process may occur when the alien suffers
prejudice in the lower court. 
14
In Nicholas v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 42 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the suspect alien had not suffered
any prejudice when his request to the Service for copies of docu-
mentary evidence was not met.' 43 The court found that the Ser-
permission).
135. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsITUToNAL LAW 507 (1978).
136. Unification Church v. Attorney General, 581 F.2d 870, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(quot-
ing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1976)).
137. 457 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
138. Id. at 1354.
139. 183 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1950).
140. 283 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960).
141. Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979); Burquez v. INS, 513 F.2d 751 (10th
Cir. 1975).
142. 590 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1979).
143. Id. at 810.
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vice's actions had not denied the alien "a meaningful opportunity
to litigate the issues presented on appeal.""4 However, one could
reasonably conclude that had the court discovered even slight
prejudice, the doctrine of fundamental fairness would have re-
quired a reversal of the lower court decision.
The Supreme Court's unwillingness to clarify the "fundamen-
tal fairness" doctrine in deportation actions has created a serious
conflict within the federal circuits. In certain jurisdictions aliens
are found to have been denied Fourteenth Amendment rights only
where there has been a gross miscarriage of justice. In other juris-
dictions alien due process rights are considered violated if the de-
fendant has merely suffered some prejudice.
In applying the nebulous doctrine of fundamental fairness,
federal courts have found no offense to due process where the sus-
pect alien was mentally incompetent and therefore unaware of the
proceedings against him,145 where the immigration judge was re-
placed after 60% of the proceedings had already been com-
pleted,146 or where the alien was found deportable solely on the
basis of admissions made by his attorney.1 47 The doctrine is much
too flexible. It allows the courts to determine important constitu-
tional rights on a case by case basis. In any given situation, immi-
gration judges may exercise arbitrary powers which will be upheld
on appeal because circuit court decisions provide conflicting stan-
dards of review.
B. Self-Incrimination
Current immigration laws do not allow aliens to assert any
right to freedom from self-incrimination. In United States ex rel.
Bilokumsky v. Tod,1 48 the Supreme Court held that aliens did not
have the right to remain silent. Furthermore, a refusal to testify
permitted the inference that the individual was in fact an alien.
149
The alien in the Bilokumsky case had "admitted that he was an
alien, but denied that he had done anything which rendered him
liable to deportation";1 50 there was nothing to suggest that he
made his statement because of threats or promises of favor.1 51
144. Id.
145. See Nee Hao Wong v. INS, 550 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1977).
146. See LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976).
147. See Chen v. Palmer, 589 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1978).
148. 263 U.S. 149 (1923).
149. Id. at 154.
150. Id. at 151.
151. Id.
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Bilokumsky, therefore, did establish that voluntariness is an essen-
tial element in deportation hearings,152 as it is in criminal trials.
153
In Bong Youn Choy v. Barber,54 the defendant, Choy, was
threatened with deportation to Korea where he would have been
subjected to political persecution. The Immigration Officers ob-
tained Choy's confession to his affiliation with the Communist
Party by repeatedly threatening to bring charges of perjury against
him. They also made it clear to Choy that his wife and children
would suffer if he did not comply with their demand. The court of
appeals invalidated Choy's deportation order, holding that "[a]
statement obtained by the government by inducing fear through
official threats of prosecution is not voluntarily given. It can no
more be used as a basis for deportation than for conviction of a
crime."
1 55
Although the Miranda v. Arizona156 rule, rendering involun-
tary statements inadmissible as evidence, does not apply to depor-
tation proceedings, 57 due process158 may bar admission of state-
ments made by aliens who have not been informed of their rights
under the regulations.159 In Navia-Duran v. Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service'6" the alien suspect was approached late at
night by an immigration officer who entered and searched her
home, and questioned her in an intimidating manner for a period
of four hours.
The First Circuit determined "from the totality of circum-
stances surrounding [her] apprehension and interrogation that the
order of deportation was rendered in violation of due process."16
Significantly, the court based its decision on the fact that the Ser-
vice had failed to inform Ms. Navia-Duran that Immigration and
Naturalization Service regulations granted her the right to remain
silent.162 Although the outcome of the case was based on the Ser-
vice's failure to warn the defendant of her right against self-in-
152. Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1960).
153. See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
154. 279 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1960).
155. Id. at 647 (citations omitted).
156. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a discussion of the exclusionary rule see Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
157. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d at 808; Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366, 368-
69 (9th Cir. 1975).
158. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d at 809.
159. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (1980); 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1980).
160. 568 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1977).
161. Id. at 804-05.
162. Id. at 809 (referring to 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1980)).
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crimination, the court nevertheless touched on the merits of the
theory that the regulations may themselves create due process
rights.
6 3
Despite judicial attempts to limit deportations founded on co-
erced confessions, different standards of voluntariness in civil and
criminal proceedings'" deprive aliens of many rights enjoyed by
suspects in criminal trials. In most jurisdictions an alien's silence
may be used to infer alienage,165 and contrary to the rule in crimi-
nal proceedings,166 an alien's statement made without counsel is
admissible.1 6 7 However, there is little consistency among the fed-
eral circuits as to the scope of an alien's right against self-incrimi-
nation. For instance, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Trias-Her-
nandez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service1 68 differed
sharply from the First Circuit's holding in Navia-Duran. In Trias-
Hernandez, Judge Wright stated that "[t]he language of the regu-
lation169 neither requires specifically the use of Miranda warnings
nor does it provide for comparable admonitions.
1 7 0
Aliens do not have the protection of the Fifth Amendment
prohibition against requiring witnesses to testify against them-
selves. The most that they can hope for is that where the courts
encounter clear cut instances of coercion, they will find that evi-
dence so obtained is inadmissible as contrary to the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As long as deportation re-
mains a civil action, admissions of alienage will not trigger the
Fifth Amendment protections enjoyed by criminal defendants.
C. The Right to Counsel
It is undisputed that aliens have both a statutory 1 7 and a con-
stitutional1"2 right to counsel in deportation proceedings, but un-
like criminal defendants, 17 3 indigent aliens do not have a right to
163. Id. at 808-09.
164. See Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366, 368-69 (9th Cir. 1975). The main dis-
tinction revolves around the civil/criminal dichotomy which permits immigration courts to
admit statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules.
165. See Chevez-Raya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir. 1975).
166. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
167. Lavoie v. INS, 418 F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1969).
168. 528 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1975).
169. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1980).
170. 528 F.2d at 369.
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1976).
172. Ramirez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1977).
173. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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court appointed counsel.174 In fact, the Immigration and National-
ity Act expressly prohibits the government from providing counsel
at its expense to aliens who cannot afford to pay for it them-
selves. 175 The courts have been reluctant to find a right to court
appointed counsel for aliens in light of this manifestation of con-
trary congressional intent. However, the courts alone determine
the limits of fundamental fairness, and if Congress trespasses
within those boundries, the judicial power must control.176
Significantly, the Supreme Court has not limited the right to
assigned counsel to criminal cases. In the case of In re Gault,1 77 the
Court found that a right to court appointed counsel existed in the
civil commitment of juveniles, and in Gagnon v. Scarpelli
178 it
found a similar right in administrative hearings on parole and pro-
bation violations.
Both situations involved a possible deprivation of liberty
which was arguably no worse than the deprivation many aliens ex-
perience when they are deported. 17 However, the court extended
the right to assigned counsel to these cases because the proceed-
ings would otherwise violate the Sixth Amendment. s° Although
the courts will probably not apply the Sixth Amendment in a simi-
lar fashion to deportation hearings as long as they are considered
civil proceedings, they may find the fundamental fairness doctrine
sufficiently flexible to provide a procedural right to assigned coun-
sel, particularly in light of the fact that an alien's inability to pay
for an attorney will normally result in a complete lack of legal
assistance.
Unlike other civil proceedings where only private parties are
involved, aliens subject to deportation must face the awesome
power of the state. They are often unable to speak English and are
generally unfamiliar with the American legal system. Yet, despite
the clear indications that it is fundamentally unfair to deport
aliens who have not had legal representation, the courts have re-
sisted efforts to provide aliens with counsel at government ex-
pense,18' and have preferred to base the general right to counsel at
174. Chlomos v. Department of Justice, 516 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1975).
175. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1976).
176. See note 132 and accompanying text supra.
177. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
178. 411 U.S. 778-(1973).
179. Many aliens ,face the very real possibility that they will starve to death, see
Mayer, The Dimensions of Human Hunger, in HUMAN NUTRITION 234 (1978).
180. See Note, Due Process and Deportation-Is There a Right to Assigned Counsel?,
8 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 289, 299 (1975).
181. See Henriques v. INS, 465 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1972).
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the alien's expense on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds."8 2
Despite the fact that the federal courts have not based the
right to counsel in deportation hearings on the Sixth Amend-
ment, 83 they continue to define alien rights to counsel with terms
analogous to those used in criminal proceedings. In Partible v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service,M the alien defendant
"waived her rights [to counsel] without being provided with any
understanding... of the complexity of her dilemma and without
any awareness of the cogent legal arguments which could have
been made on her behalf."'185 The court, when reversing the depor-
tation order on the basis that the defendant's "waiver of counsel
was not 'competently and understandingly made,"" 8 borrowed
language from Argersinger v. Hamlin,187 the foremost criminal case
on waiver of counsel.
Similarly, in Castaneda-Delgado v. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service,""" the court found that the alien defendant was
improperly denied a continuance he needed in order to hire an at-
torney. Relying on the criminal case of United States v. Robin-
son,1 9 District Judge Bryan stated "the courts have repeatedly
recognized that denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
so inherently prejudicial that there is no room for the harmless
error doctrine." 90 This reliance on criminal precedent illustrates
the lack of a clear conceptual separation between deportation hear-
ings, which are ostensibly civil, and criminal trials.' 9'
182. See Castro-Nuno v. INS, 577 F.2d 577, 578 (9th Cir. 1978); Castaneda-Delgado v.
INS, 525 F.2d 1295, 1296 (7th Cir. 1975).
183. See Ramirez v. INS, 550 F.2d 560, 563 (9th Cir. 1977), where the court found
"[t]he Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to counsel is not applicable to deportation
proceedings," presumably because they are not criminal prosecutions. Yet the majority
found that the defendant alien had a right to counsel arising out of Fifth Amendment guar-
antees, rather than the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
184. 600 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1979).
185. Id. at 1096.
186. Id. (citation omitted).
187. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
188. 525 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1975).
189. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
190. 525 F.2d at 1300 (emphasis added).
191. One possible explanation for the judicial, congressional and executive refusal to
expand the alien right to counsel is that it might prove extremely costly to provide lawyers
for the many indigent aliens who cross the Mexican border daily. However, there is no real
justification for attempting to alleviate the United States' problem with illegal immigrants
by denying the entire alien population important constitutional rights.
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D. Search and Seizure
Immigration officers can interrogate anyone they believe to be
an alien,192 and they can make a warrantless arrest of any alien
suspected of being in the United States unlawfully.193 However,
federal courts have held that these powers are limited by the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures.'"
The courts seem to have expanded the Fourth Amendment
rights of aliens more out of concern for the welfare of United
States citizens than for the protection of aliens. In United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce,95 the Supreme Court stated that the congres-
sional power to subject aliens to reasonable questioning could not
"diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be
mistaken for aliens."1 96
To the extent that the federal courts have applied the Fourth
Amendment to alien rights, they have generally adopted criminal
law precedent when deciding search and seizure issues. In
Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court relied on Terry v. Ohio 97 to
limit interrogation to situations where the Service could show a
"reasonable suspicion" of alienage.' 93 In Lee v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 99 the Third Circuit construed the statu-
tory term "reason to believe" to be coterminous with "probable
cause" as used in criminal law.200 Similarly, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit relied on the criminal case of Adams v. Williams20 L
when determining whether the interrogation of an Asian immi-
grant constituted "mere questioning.
'20 2
However, the federal courts have not completely accepted
criminal law precedent, and have normally set standards more
favorable to the government. Contrary to the Terry determination
that "whenever a police officer ... restrains [an individual's] free-
192. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1)(1976).
193. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2)(1976).
194. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 884. Aliens were not really entitled to Fourth Amendment rights, but the
only way to insure citizen rights was to protect everyone, including aliens. This rationale
could be extended. For instance, if an indigent citizen should be mistakenly arrested as an
illegal alien, he would not have the benefit of counsel.
197. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
198. 422 U.S. at 884.
199. 590 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1979).
200. Id. at 500.
201. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
202. See Cheung Tin Wong v. INS, 468 F.2d 1123, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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dom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person,"2 ' the Seventh Cir-
cuit has held that the standard of "reasonable suspicion" is limited
to situations where the officer temporarily detains the suspect with
force or the threat of force on the basis that he is illegally in the
United States. If the officer merely wants to question the suspect,
without forcibly detaining him, he must have a reasonable belief
that the suspect is an alien.204
The District Court in Marquez v. Kiley205 found the distinc-
tion between mere questioning" and forcible detention unwork-
able. The court noted that the dichotomy "undermined the reali-
ties of the matter"20 7 and stated that it was "the nature of an
oxymoron to speak of 'casual' inquiry between a government offi-
cial, armed with a badge and a gun and charged with enforcing the
nation's immigration laws, and a person suspected of alienage. 2 08
It concluded that the same standard which applies to criminal
cases should also apply to deportation. Accordingly, immigration
officers should not be able to approach an alien for questioning un-
less they have a reasonable suspicion of alienage.
The Third Circuit resolved the issue by determining that
where a stop and interrogation were "reasonably related in scope
to the justification for their initiation," they would not violate the
Fourth Amendment.20 9 The court also held that an officer could
base his suspicion on the suspect's mode of dress, language, de-
meanor and other subjective factors. 10 While the Third Circuit's
interpretation of the Terry standard may not significantly deter
official misconduct, it is certainly more protective of resident alien
rights than the Seventh Circuit's diluted standard.
The primary issue remaining in the application of the Fourth
Amendment to deportation proceedings is whether the federal
courts will invoke the exclusionary rule211 as a means of insuring
Immigration Service compliance. So far, the courts have refused to
apply the exclusionary rule where the only illegally seized evidence
203. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 16.
204. Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 548 F.2d 715, 715 (7th Cir. 1977), modifying,
540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976).
205. 436 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
206. See Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1979), for a good example of
mere questioning.
207. 436 F. Supp. at 113.
208. Id.
209. Lee v. INS, 590 F.2d at 502 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at
881, and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 29).
210. 590 F.2d at 502.
211. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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was the person arrested 21 2 on the theory that: "[t]o grant life-long
immunity from investigation and prosecution simply because a vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment first indicated to the police that a
man was not the law-abiding citizen he purported to be would
stretch the exclusionary rule beyond tolerable bounds.
21 S
However, the circuits have found that evidence obtained from
illegal searches of premises may be inadmissible. In Wong Chung
Che v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,2 14 the First Cir-
cuit held that if the evidence offered by the Service at the deporta-
tion hearing was "obtained through an illegal search, there is no
authority of which we are aware that would make it admissible."2 15
The majority stated that "[w]hile wide latitude is permitted the
government in introducing statements of arrested suspects,
whether or not they might be suppressed in a criminal proceeding,
we can think of no justification by necessity for encouraging illegal
searches of premises."
216
Although the general rule requires the application of the ex-
clusionary rule to illegal searches of premises, the federal courts
are not unanimously in favor of placing such a restriction on the
Immigration Service. In Smith v. Morris,1 7 a federal district court
judge maintained in dicta that the exclusionary rule had no appli-
cation to deportation procedure because it "serves no useful pur-
pose in any deportation proceeding in which the decision does not
depend upon proof of specific events, but merely on proof of sta-
tus. ' 21 8 Since most deportation actions turn on the identity and
status of the defendant rather than factual proof of the elements of
a crime, the court concluded that the "application of an exclusion-
ary rule could not have any significant impact on the result of the
deportation proceeding.
21 9
The Board of Immigration Appeals has disregarded Wong
Chung Che and has adhered to the Smith theory.220 Reasoning
212. See, e.g., Huerta-Cabrera v. INS, 466 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1972) (the court admitted
evidence obtained through the interrogation of an illegally arrested alien); see also Hoonsi-
lapa v. INS, 575 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1978); Nai Cheng Chen v. INS, 537 F.2d 566 (1st Cir.
1976).
213. Hoonsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1978).
214. 565 F.2d 166 (1st Cir. 1977).
215. Id. at 169.
216. Id.
217. '442 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
218. Id. at 714.
219. Id.
220. See Matter of Sandoval, Interim Decision 2725, at 8 (BIA 1979). The Board re-
jected Wong Chung Che because it "was based in large part on what was viewed as the long
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that the Supreme Court has never upheld exclusion of evidence
from purely civil proceedings, the Board has refused to apply the
exclusionary rule in deportation actions.221 The Board has come to
the conclusion that the exclusionary rule should not apply to de-
portation because "pragmatic analysis" reveals that the societal in-
terest in the expeditious enforcement of immigration laws out-
weighs the alien's interest in the enforcement of Fourth
Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 222 Additionally, the Board has stated that it has "no con-
vincing empirical evidence that the exclusionary rule has operated
to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment.
'223
The BIA maintains that it is justified in disregarding the First
Circuit's ruling on the application of the exclusionary rule to de-
portation hearings because the Supreme Court has not dealt with
the issue for fifty-five years. However, when the Supreme Court
has considered the issue, it has held in favor of excluding illegally
obtained evidence.224
The extent to which alien Fourth Amendment rights will be
protected by the federal courts remains an unknown factor. As
long as the courts refuse to apply criminal procedural safeguards to
deportation hearings, aliens will not receive constitutional
protection.
E. Burden of Proof
In Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,225 the
United States Supreme Court held that the level of proof required
to deport was "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that
the facts alleged as grounds for deportation are true. '226 Woodby
represents one of the few instances in which the Court has re-
sponded to an obvious ambiguity in deportation law.
In Sherman v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,227 the
history of 'assumed' inadmissibility rather than on a detailed analysis of the relative merits
of excluding such evidence from deportation proceedings." Id.
221. Id. at 9.
222. Id. at 10. If the societal interest in preventing criminals from being set free is
outweighed by the Fourth Amendment (see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963)), then alien Fourth Amendment rights certainly outweigh the societal interest in de-
porting illegal immigrants.
223. See Matter of Sandoval, Interim Decision 2725, at 12 (BIA 1979).
224. See United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923) (dicta).
225. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
226. Id. at 286.
227. 350 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1965), rev'd en banc, 350 F.2d at 901.
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Second Circuit originally found that "beyond a reasonable doubt"
was the test in deportation cases where the defendant had resided
in the United States for a significant length of time.228 However,
the Second Circuit ultimately reversed its decision in Sherman and
adopted the dissenting view that Congress had set the level of
proof and that the courts lacked the authority to change it.2 9
The United States Supreme Court in Woodby rejected this ar-
gument on the basis that the degree of proof in deportation cases
was "the kind of question which has traditionally been left to the
judiciary to resolve,"230 and because they considered the statutory
standard of "reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence 231 as
merely a congressional attempt to set the scope of judicial re-
view.2 2 The Court plowed the middle ground between the appel-
lant's contention in Sherman, that the degree of proof should have
been "beyond reasonable doubt," and the government's contention
that it should have been "by a preponderance. '23 3 Ultimately, the
Second Circuit concluded that the Woodby "clear, unequivocal,
and convincing" test approached the level of proof required in a
criminal case.2 3
Although the degree of proof in deportation cases seems to ap-
proach the level established for criminal trials, the burden of proof
is an entirely different matter. The initial burden is on the accused
to show lawful entry into the United States, and once he meets
that burden, the government need only make out a prima facie
case of deportability which then creates a rebuttable presumption
that the alien is deportable.235 This standard varies substantially
from the "innocent until proven guilty" credo in criminal law, and
stretches the concept of fundamental fairness.
236
F. Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy and the Eighth
Amendment
Aliens have been denied the constitutional protection against
228. 350 F.2d at 899. The circuit court initially accepted the petitioner's argument
that "the requirements of due process in deportation proceedings should be elaborated by
analogy to the criminal law rather than to the law of economic regulation." Id. at 896.
229. Id. at 900-01.
230. 385 U.S. at 284.
231. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4) (1976).
232. 385 U.S. at 282.
233. Id. at 284-85.
234. See Nason v. INS, 394 F.2d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 1968).
235. Hobnsilapa v. INS, 575 F.2d 735, 737 (9th Cir. 1978).
236. E.g., an alien who has lost his green card theoretically cannot meet the initial
burden of proving lawful entry.
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ex post facto laws because the term ex post facto by definition
refers to criminal penalties.2 7 Aliens have also been denied the
protection of the constitutional prohibition against double jeop-
ardy, the rationale being that deportation is a civil rather than
criminal action.238
The result of the federal courts' refusal to extend the ex post
facto prohibition to deportation law has been that Congress, under
the plenary power, may decree that aliens are deportable for past
activities that were completely innocent. Resident aliens have no
way of knowing when or for what reason they will be deported.2 3 9
Similarly, the denial of the double jeopardy prohibition allows the
government to initiate deportation proceedings against aliens who
have been convicted of crimes despite the fact that deportation
may work a much greater hardship on the alien than would the
criminal sanction. 40
For example, in LeTourneur v. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, 41 the defendant alien, who was responsible for sup-
porting two children, had lived in the United States for all but four
of his thirty-seven years. In 1973 he was convicted of armed rob-
bery and sentenced to prison. The Immigration Service subse-
quently brought a deportation action against him. On appeal the
circuit court found that the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
double jeopardy did not apply despite the fact that the result
"'bristles with severities.' ",242
In Bassett v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,243 the
Tenth Circuit upheld the deportation of an alien who had been
convicted of possession of marijuana even though the Second Cir-
cuit had refused to deport John Lennon for the same offense.
244
The Tenth Circuit distinguished Lennon v. Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service,245 on the basis that Lennon was convicted in
England where there is no mens rea requirement for possession of
marijuana.246 However, neither court considered applying the con-
237. See Calder v. Bull, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 396 (1798); Note, Resident Aliens and
Due Process: Anatomy of a Deportation, 8 VsL. L. REv. 566, 587 (1963).
238. See LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976).
239. See 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.3c
(1980).
240. E.g., Bassett v. INS, 581 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1978).
241. 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976).
242. Id. at 1370 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 (1952)).
243. 581 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1978).
244. Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1975).
245. Id.
246. 581 F.2d at 1386.
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stitutional prohibition against double jeopardy to deportation
procedures.
Although the alien in Bassett argued that his "deportation is
additional punishment for his crime," the court rejected his con-
tention on the basis that the "[i]mmigration laws never have been
considered penal." 247 Had the appellant enjoyed a greater degree of
constitutional protection, he would have been able to combat his
deportation as easily as had Lennon, who enjoyed a greater degree
of notoriety and public support.24 The federal courts should not
be required to rely on legal technicalities in order to avoid inequi-
table results.
Theoretically, the courts shoul4 not consider the hardship
which results from the denial of the double jeopardy prohibition
when formulating results in deportation actions. Despite the fact
that judges throughout history have characterized deportation as a
severe punishment,249 the federal courts have continued to insist
that deportation is a civil rather than criminal process,25 and
therefore have refused to apply the Eighth Amendment prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment.251
However, the federal district court in Lieggi v. Immigration
and Naturalization Service252 attempted to apply the Eighth
247. Id. at 1387.
248. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1980, at 76.
249. See e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 739-40 (1893) (Brewer, J.,
dissenting); Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 1975) (Demascio, J., dis-
senting: "No matter the classification, deportation is punishment, pure and simple"); United
States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630, 630 (2d Cir. 1926) (Hand, J., dissenting: deporta-
tion is a "dreadful punishment").
250. But cf. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (lamenting the fact that
deportation may deprive a person of "all that makes life worth living").
251. Oliver v. Department of Justice, 517 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1975).
252. 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. l. 1975), rev'd mem., 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976). District
Judge Bauer rejected 100 years of precedent and declared that deportation is punishment
and that persons facing deportation are entitled to the same constitutional safeguards that
criminal defendants enjoy. 389 F. Supp. at 19. Rather than rely on some obscure technical-
ity, Judge Bauer invoked equitable principles and stated that to have decided otherwise
would have been an "acrimonious act under our contemporary standards of decency and
equality." Id. at 21.
Judge Bauer rejected the civil/criminal distinction because he believed that the powers
inherent in sovereignty theory rendered the issue of whether deportation is penal in nature
moot since the political branches can do whatever they please with aliens. He claimed that
the "Court's Fong Yue Ting premise that deportation is not punishment is fundamentally
unbelievable." Id. at 17. And even if it were believeable, "it seems unnecessary to argue
whether the penalty is civil or criminal [because] the classification becomes merely a means
of holding that procedural rights do not apply to deportation, without facing the general
issue of whether a government may perform such 'sovereign' acts in ways repugnant to the
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Amendment to deportation hearings on the equitable ground that
the defendant alien "will suffer severe punishment in relation to
the offense."253 The Seventh Circuit summarily reversed this deci-
sion,25' and the defendant alien who had been convicted for having
given a marijuana cigarette to a friend, was subsequently deported.
The circuit court apparently could not accept the district judge's
decision to abolish the civil/criminal distinction. Nevertheless, the
distinction permits the government to exploit its civil powers
255
and thereby to exact ever greater penalties from aliens by denying
them important constitutional rights.
If the circuit court had upheld the lower court in Lieggi, alien
defendants in deportation proceedings would ultimately benefit
from the procedural protections currently afforded defendants in
criminal trials.256 The civil/criminal dichotomy constitutes a nearly
insurmountable barrier to alien rights, especially with respect to
the judicial denial of the constitutional prohibitions against ex
post facto laws, double jeopardy, and cruel and unusual
punishment.257
Conclusion
Procedural due process in deportation hearings, as defined by
the ambiguous doctrine of fundamental fairness, offers insufficient
protection to this nation's alien population. A citizen accused of an
offense has available the full protection of the Constitution while
Constitution." Id. (quoting Note, Immigrants, Aliens, and the Constitution, 49 NOTRE
DAmE LAw. 1095 (1974)); see generally A. PosT, THE DEPORTATIONS DELIRIUM OF NiNETEEN-
TwENTY (1923).
He based his decision on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
389 F. Supp. at 19; accord, Note, Aliens, Deportation and the Equal Protection Clause: A
Critical Reappraisal, 6 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 23 (1975). He claimed that "since the Su-
preme Court has recognized that alienage is a suspect criterion, the application of the pen-
alty of deportation, a penalty which applies only to aliens, should be upheld only upon the
showing of a compelling state interest." 389 F. Supp. at 19; contra, Narenji v. Civiletti, 617
F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979) where the circuit court held that discrimination against Iranian
students need only have been rationally based to comply with the equal protection clause.
Id. at 747.
253. 389 F. Supp. at 21.
254. 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976) (no published opinion).
255. 389 F. Supp. at 17. The district court reasoned that the inherent powers theory
granted the government unrestrained power which was subject to abuse. See, e.g., Narenji v.
Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The deportation of Iranian students illustrates the
potential of unfettered executive power. The American alien community may at any time be
held hostage to the whims of domestic political opinion as influenced by international
events.
256. See note 252 supra.
257. The dichotomy has precluded even a limited grant of the protection afforded by
these prohibitions. Cf. the discussion of the limited right to counsel, notes 171-91 supra.
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an alien must resort to the scanty protection afforded by conflict-
ing judicial doctrines. 58 Despite the fact that deportation "is a
drastic measure which amounts to a grave penalty," 59 millions of
people260 must live under the threat of deportation with no real
certainty that the law will not change their status,261 or that they
will not be subject to the harassment of repetitious deportation
proceedings.26 2 Believing deportation to be a civil process subject
only to the political authority, the federal courts have failed to
clearly articulate alien rights. Given the inequitable results of this
assumption, federal courts should abandon it and recognize that
deportation hearings are essentially criminal in nature and
effect.
263
Even if the courts should find it impractical to extend criminal
procedural safeguards to undocumented aliens who have surrepti-
tiously crossed the American border, they should nevertheless ex-
tend a greater degree of protection to lawful permanent residents
who have not circumvented the immigration laws.26 Although it
would be most equitable to extend criminal procedural safeguards
to all aliens within the United States, the alternative of applying
such safeguards only to lawful residents would at least be more
equitable than the present system.
The federal courts should more clearly define and enforce the
constitutional protections they have imposed on the deportation
process. This could be accomplished by forcing the Immigration
Service to adhere to the regulations,265 and by setting forth the cir-
cumstances under which the regulations create procedural due pro-
cess rights. 66 Additionally, the courts should exclude evidence ob-
tained from illegal searches and seizures,267 and extend the rule in
Miranda to avoid involuntary confessions.26 8 The courts also
should require that counsel be provided to indigent aliens in order
258. See § III(A) supra.
259. Hailer v. Esperdy, 397 F.2d 211, 214 (2d Cir. 1968).
260. Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1979, at 16, col. 1.
261. LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1976).
262. See 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFiELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §4.3i
(1979).
263. See Lieggi v. INS, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd mem., 529 F.2d 530 (7th
Cir. 1976).
264. See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra. The Fong Yue Ting Court suggested
that the plenary power only applies to aliens who fail to take "steps towards becoming citi-
zens." 149 U.S. at 724.
265. See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
266. See § I(C) supra.
267. See § III(D) supra.
268. See § I1(B) supra.
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to effectuate the right to meaningful representation.2 69 Finally, and
most importantly, the federal courts should define the doctrine of
fundamental fairness so as to provide deportation procedure with a
proper constitutional foundation rather than an amorphous and
nearly unintelligible set of constantly changing rules.
2 7 0
Deportation is a severe criminal sanction which is invoked for
the crime of illegally residing in the United States. Although ex-
pressed congressional objectives may not include the concept of
punishment, linguistical niceties do not eliminate the punitive ef-
fect of deportation on aliens. When people are seized from their
homes, subjected to a summary hearing and -transported across the
border, they are deprived of rights possessed by citizens under the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments. The fact that the
Congress and the courts have chosen not to treat aliens as "per-
sons" within the contemplation of these amendments is repugnant
to the spirit and the letter of the Constitution.
269. See § IH(C) supra.
270. See § III(A) supra.
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